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Abstract
The commentary focuses on the spread of Covid-19 misinformation in Italy, highlighting the dynamics that have impacted
on its pandemic communication. Italy has recently been affected by a progressive erosion of trust in public institutions and
a general state of information crisis regarding matters of health and science. In this context, the politicization of health
issues and a growing use of social media to confront the Coronavirus “infodemic” have led the Italian Ministry of Health to
play a strategic role in using its official Facebook page to mitigate the spread of misinformation and to offer updates to on-
line publics. Despite this prompt intervention, which increased the visibility and reliability of public health communication,
coordinated efforts involving different institutions, media and digital platform companies still seem necessary to reduce
the impact of misinformation, as using a multichannel strategy helps avoid increasing social and technological disparities
at a time of crisis.
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1. Introduction
Originating in December 2019 in Wuhan, Covid-19
rapidly spread across China due to the interconnected
systems of globalized modernity (Sastry & Dutta, 2012),
where everybody is a plane ride away from chains of
lethal transmission (Ungar, 2001). As Italy became the
first Western country to be affected by Covid-19, it im-
mediately was involved in an “infodemic” characterized
by a mix of facts, fears, rumors and speculations.
The lack of information about the virus and its con-
sequences for people’s safety, the uncertainty as to how
it might be transmitted, and the dissemination of vari-
ous types of misinformation about Covid-19 worked to-
gether to increase this stream of infodemic. The chaotic
flow of communication compounds an information cri-
sis that has dogged Italy over the last decade, with anti-
science movements having gained visibility in the digi-
tal realm, being often covered by the mass media and
heavily politicized by populist parties (Lovari, Martino, &
Righetti, 2020).
When, on 20 February, a 38-year-old Italian man was
placed in intensive care in Codogno (North of Italy) and
tested positive for the virus, the country was immedi-
ately up against an emergency from a health and com-
munication point of view. The following weeks saw a
rollercoaster of polarized interventions and sentiments,
accelerated by constant public disputes between scien-
tists and politicians, spectacularized by mainstream me-
dia, and fueled by partisan interests. This anxiogenic situ-
ation escorted the country until 9Marchwhen the Prime
Minister, Giuseppe Conte, declared a lockdown in order
to stop the spread of the virus. A few days later, theWord
Health Organization (WHO) characterized Covid-19 as a
pandemic, the first caused by a Coronavirus and the first
entrenched on social media.
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In this framework, the commentary focuses on the
main characteristics of the Italian infodemic, with spe-
cific attention to misinformation about Covid-19 on so-
cial media, and highlights how the Italian Ministry of
Health (IMH) has faced this online.
2. The Italian Context
In recent years, Italy has increasingly dealt with anti-
science movements that have questioned the value of
experts and scientists and that represent one of the
main effects of a postmodern conception of health (Kata,
2012). This process is related to socio-cultural transfor-
mations which have led to a growing public engagement
with scientific questions and increasing intersections be-
tween expert knowledge and citizens’ responses, which
foster a demand for non-expert participation in health in-
tervention processes and a less passive attitude towards
the professionals’ authority. In this respect, the relation-
ship between science and lay publics has profoundly
changed, impacting on the credibility of public health in-
stitutions. The development of digital technologies and
the pervasiveness of personal media have enhanced this
process, challenging the role of governments and insti-
tutions. This demands the adoption of new communica-
tion models not only to relate with media, but also to
converse with different publics who are now enabled to
make their voices heard by medical experts and health
institutions on social media (Lovari, 2017).
In this context, Italy suffers from a general lack of
trust in public institutions. Italy was one of the six coun-
tries to register an extreme decline in trust, with an
overall decrease of 21 points in one year, and with gov-
ernment and media being the least trusted institutions
(Edelman, 2018). This lack of trust is also marked in re-
lation to science and scientists. Italians were found to
be more skeptical than other European citizens about
the beneficial impact of technoscience (Eurobarometer,
2010). Moreover, Italians have much less confidence in
the impact of technological and scientific innovations on
their health (51%), in comparison with the other coun-
tries (76.5% on average). Lower rates are also reported
for trust in scientists (56.9%), especially when scientific
studies deal with controversial research funded by pri-
vate companies (54%; Eurobarometer, 2014).
This skepticism was clearly manifested in the con-
troversy which has raged in Italy over the issue of vac-
cinations, fueled by the activism of the anti-vax move-
ments on socialmedia (Tipaldo, 2019), a debatewhich re-
veals starkly polarized user opinions, often accompanied
by echo-chamber effects (Schmidt, Zollo, Scala, Betsch,
& Quattrociocchi, 2018). This process was accelerated
by the politicization of the topic, which meshed with
the spread of populist anti-elitism movements and the
diffusion of conspiracy theories (Mancosu, Vassallo, &
Vezzoni, 2017), helping to erode the lay-public’s confi-
dence in scientific and health facts. In facing this chal-
lenge, the Italian Ministry of Health and public health
authorities decided to use social media to make their
voices heard online and counteract the misinformation,
but with mixed results and a lack of coordination at cen-
tral and regional level (Lovari, 2017).
This information crisis was the fertile humus for the
Covid-19 infodemic that struck Italy in February 2020.
Uncertainty, distrust and fears were further accentuated
by the role played by several Italian physicians who pub-
licly started talking about the virus on their social me-
dia profiles or were interviewed by mainstream media
in news and talk shows. Discordant medical voices were
embedded and spectacularized by media logics, becom-
ing spreadable content on digital platforms, often politi-
cized or associated with fake news and conspiracy theo-
ries, thus increasing distrust among connected publics.
3. Misinformation Meets Covid-19
The uncertainty surrounding the etiology and the conse-
quences of the virus gave rise to a cacophony of voices, in
which institutional communication was often misaligned
with media coverage and with an indistinguishable mix
of misinformation, unverified rumors and intentionally
manipulated disinformation (Larson, 2020). The quan-
tity of information about Coronavirus rapidly increased
online. According to social media monitoring by the
Vaccine Confidence Project, 3.08 million messages about
Covid-19 were disseminated daily between January and
mid-March 2020 (Larson, 2020). Different types of misin-
formation accounted for a sizeable portion of the content.
These rumors and hoaxes spread rapidly on the social
web, disturbing the authenticity balance of the commu-
nication ecosystems. This factor quickly pushed govern-
ments to commit to curbing the spread ofmisinformation
to avoid the risk of behaviors that are potentially harm-
ful to the population. For instance, a study analyzing mis-
information rated false by independent fact-checkers re-
ported that false content wasmostly spread on social me-
dia (88%), assuming various textual and visual reconfigu-
rations. Moreover, the most recurrent claim concerned
policies or interventions taken by public authorities to
tackle the spread of Covid-19, alleging that health orga-
nizations and governments had not fully succeeded in of-
fering reliable information in response to demands from
the public (Brennen, Simon, Howard, & Nielsen, 2020).
Italy was totally involved in this infodemic. For in-
stance, a report highlighted that the term “Coronavirus”
accounted for 575,000 searches by Italian users out of
a monthly total of 950,000 (Sciuto & Paoletti, 2020).
In a study by Edelman (2020), Italy was the country
with the highest percentage of people accessing news
and information about the virus on a daily basis (58%),
overtaking countries like Korea, Japan and US. AGCOM
(2020) found that, as a proportion of disinformation pub-
lished online, Coronavirus contents rose from 5% in early
January to 46% in late March. On social media, in par-
ticular, Coronavirus posts increased to 36% of all mes-
sages produced by disinformation sources. Part of this
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disinformation seemed to be linked to conspiracy the-
ories and false reports and claims from actors close to
Russia and China, aiming to undermine alliances within
the European Union when Italy was facing the first phase
of the emergency (EEAS, 2020). Despite the commit-
ment of digital companies to stop the spread of misinfor-
mation, and notwithstanding the strategic partnerships
forged between the WHO and the health ministries of
several countries, fake news remained difficult to con-
tain. One study described how misinformation was not
uniformly removed by Facebook (Avaaz, 2020): 68% of
Italian-language misinformation was not labeled to alert
users to Covid-19 fake news.Moreover, 21%of the Italian
misinformation posts fell into the category of “harmful
content” that Facebook has committed to remove, but
these posts were still present in early April.
4. The Role of The Italian Ministry of Health
It was in this problematical situation that the Italian
Ministry of Health assumed a central role by starting
to produce messages about the virus in an attempt
both to respond to growing demands from citizens and
to stem the tide of inaccurate information. Specific at-
tention was devoted to the ministerial website with a
Covid-19 section, both in Italian and English, with a the-
matic page to counter misinformation, named “Attenti
alle bufale” (Beware of hoaxes), which disproves more
than 50 Coronavirus hoaxes circulating on social media.
A key effort was addressed to the Italian Ministry of
Health Facebook page. With the emergency, the num-
ber of likers rose from 61,196 on 30 January to 409,145
on April 3, showing the need felt by users to find a re-
liable institutional source about the virus, but also the
strategic function played by this page in mitigating the
infodemic. In those two months, the page published
301 posts, 94% of which were about Covid-19, turning
into a thematic page to face the emergency. The en-
gagement rate reached an average of 2,652 likes, 1,983
sharing, and 378 comments per post. As regards the
contents, the Italian Ministry of Health created cam-
paigns about Coronavirus (21.9%), involving famous peo-
ple and digital influencers, and using specific hashtags
(e.g., #iorestoacasa). Messages countering fake news oc-
cupied 7.1% of the institutional flow. These posts were
enriched with emoticons, infographics and social cards,
frequently integrating the words falso (false) or “fake
news” in visuals, and linking to the Covid-19 section in
the ministerial website. Several posts (12.4%) explained
the measures adopted by the Italian government in or-
der to ensure appropriate behaviors during the lockdown.
Furthermore, the contents did not feature a marked in-
cidence of politicians (8.9%), thus reducing the risk of a
politicization of the virus, one of themain concerns of the
population (Edelman, 2020). One negative aspectwas the
shortage of replies to users’ comments on the page (less
than 5%), leaving people’s queries largely unanswered
and thus possibly undermining trust in this institution.
5. Conclusions
In this first social media pandemic, the Italian Ministry
of Health has adopted specific digital communication
strategies to face the Covid-19 emergency, devoting in-
tense efforts to keeping the citizen constantly informed
and to reducing misinformation, using data and visuals
to make the messages easily understood. In February,
the Italian Ministry of Health signed partnerships with
Facebook and other digital companies to convey users’
searches on the ministerial channels. In April, the Italian
government launched a specific task force to promote
collaboration with fact-checkers and to encourage citi-
zens’ activism in signaling misinformation.
From the point of view of public health communica-
tion, all these actions proved useful in facing the acute
phase of the infodemic, raising the visibility of official
sources and aiming to restore credibility by reconnect-
ing with citizens. In this period of fear and uncertainty, a
transparent, strategic and proactive use of social media
by public health organizations seems to be fundamental
to increasing trust and reducing the impact of false nar-
ratives. In states of emergency, institutions should also
depoliticize health topics on social media channels to re-
duce further polarization and to limit the rise of new con-
flicts, both already fostered by the nature of social media
and their algorithms. Furthermore, to flatten the curve
of misinformation it seems necessary to make constant
and coordinated efforts involving authorities, mass me-
dia and digital companies. For instance, the media could
give a greater voice to journalists specialized in health
and science topics in order to contextualize data and
statistics about the virus and to decrease the spectacular-
ization of these themes merely to gain audience or clicks.
Digital companies should continue to collaborate with
governments to stop the spread of Covid-19 misinforma-
tion, elevating authoritative content and paying strategic
attention to cultural and linguistic factors that could en-
hance the dissemination of fake news. Furthermore, mis-
information should be counteracted through an exten-
sive investment inmedia education and digital literacy to
develop a critical awareness of the use of media and digi-
tal technologies. In this respect, media education should
involve society as a whole in order to increase the skills
and competences necessary to interact effectively while
negotiating the pitfalls of misinformation. Lastly, it is im-
portant that public health institutions should continue
to inform citizens with offline tools and traditional me-
dia, using a multichannel strategy, so as not to exclude
parts of the population or to increase technological and
social disparities.
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